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Although genetic disorders have been recognized for centuries, recent
advances in the study of human genetics often permit accurate de-
termination of the risk that parents will have genetically defective
children.' When this information is available either before conception
or during pregnancy, prospective parents may choose to prevent the
birth of such defective children through contraception or abortion.
Recently, courts have been called on to define the circumstances in
which either the parents or the children should receive tort damages
when parents are denied opportunities to prevent the birth of defective
children because of their physicians' negligent failure to detect or
disclose risks of genetic disorder.
Only eleven years ago, a court was unwilling to impose liability on
physicians who had given inaccurate information about the risk of an
environmentally induced birth defect.2 Yet many of the arguments that
* This work was supported in part by Medical Genetics Center grant GM 19513.
1. The pattern of inheritance of hemophilia has been known for more than two
millenia. See M. STRICKBERCER, GENETICS 220-23 (1968). Major strides were made at the
end of the nineteenth century when Francis Galton founded statistical genetics and Gregor
Mendel set forth the laws that govern the heritability of traits controlled by single genes.
See generally id. at 260-61; H. SUrToN, AN INTRODUCTION TO HUMAN GENETICS 2-5, 9-10
(2d ed. 1975). The present rapid growth of knowledge in human genetics, see, e.g., Mc-
Kusick, The Growth and Development of Human Genetics as a Clinical Discipline, 27
Am. J. HUMAN GENETics 261, 264, Table I (1975), was triggered in the 1950s by the
elucidation of the structure of DNA, the source of genetic information in most organisms,
see Watson & Crick, A Structure for Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid, 171 NATURE 737 (1953).
and by the identification of the correct number of human chromosomes, see Tjio &
Levan, The Chromosome Number of Man, 42 HEREDrAs 1 (1956). The present knowledge
of human genetics and the extent to which it is possible to predict and detect genetic
disorders is discussed at pp. 1490-94 infra.
2. In Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967), the New Jersey Supreme
Court found that a physician's failure to warn prospective parents of risks created by
maternal rubella, resulting in the birth of a defective child, had not caused compensable
injury. Viruses, such as those causing rubella, are only a few of the many environmental
agents that can cause serious harm to the developing fetus. See Kass & Shaw, The Risk of
Birth Defects: Jacobs v. Theimer and Parents' Right to Know, 2 AM. J.L. MED. 213, 220-
21 (1976-77); Comment, Wrongful Birth: The Emerging Status of a New Tort, 8 SAINT
MARY'S L.J. 140, 144 n.20 (1976); see also S. BARR WITH D. ABELOW, A WOMAN'S CHOIc E
283-85 (1977) (describing some drugs that cause fetal malformation). Since no treatment was
available once a fetus had been affected by its mother's illness, the Gleitman suit was
based on the mother's claim that had she known of the risks to her fetus, she would have
obtained an abortion. 49 N.J. at 26, 227 A.2d at 691. The Gleitman court, however, was
unwilling to approve this option. Id. at 30-31, 227 A.2d at 693-94. But see Jacobs v.
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swayed that court are no longer persuasive to courts now deciding cases
involving the birth of genetically defective children. This may be due
in part to the growing public awareness of the economic and emotional
burden of genetic disease.3 Moreover, with dramatic constitutional
developments expanding the right to choose not to procreate,4 judicial
reluctance to approve abortion undertaken to avoid the birth of defec-
tive children no longer seems justified. Thus, in Howard v. Lecher5 a
physician had allegedly been negligent in failing to detect the parents'
risk that their child would be fatally afflicted with Tay-Sachs disease.
Although the New York Court of Appeals denied the parents' cause of
action for emotional distress, 7 the lower court's recognition of their
claim for medical and funeral expenses incurred in the child's behalf
was not even appealed.8 In Park v. Chessin,9 a later case based on
allegations that the defendant physicians had given inaccurate genetic
risk information, a New York appellate court refused to dismiss a cause
of action for "injuries and conscious pain and suffering" 10 brought on
behalf of a child born with polycystic kidney disease, a degenerative
genetic disorder that inevitably leads to early death. The child's parents
were allowed to assert a claim for their medical and support expenses.
The new judicial willingness to recognize some physician liability
for failure to give accurate genetic risk information has not produced
Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 848 (Tex. 1975) (although court did not approve abortion,
extraordinary medical expenses awarded); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d
766, 769, 233 N.W.2d 372, 374 (1975) (although legality of abortion was unclear, extra-
ordinary expenses awarded). Some commentators have suggested that the Gleitman court's
decision on tort liability should be limited to situations where abortion is unavailable. See
Note, Torts Prior to Conception: A New Theory of Liability, 56 NEB. L. REv. 706, 715
(1977); Note, 10 So. TEx. L.J. 174, 178 (1968); Note, 46 Tax. L. REv. 1004, 1007-08 (1968).
3. See pp. 1496-97 infra. Congress has noted the impact of genetic disease. See H.R.
REP. No. 498, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 18-19 (1975), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 709, 726-27 [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT with page citations to [1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws].
4. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (striking down law
limiting sale and advertisement of contraceptives); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(first decision sustaining limited right to elective abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972) (first recognition of contraception as individual right).
5. 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977), aff'g 53 App. Div. 2d 420,
386 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1976).
6. The manifestations of this disorder, which inevitably causes death by the age of
four or five years, are discussed at 53 App. Div. 2d 420, 426-27, 434-35, 386 N.Y.S.2d 460,
464, 469 (1976) (Margett, J., dissenting). See H. SurroN, supra note 1, at 202-03.
7. Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 110-13, 366 N.E.2d 64, 64-66, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363,
364-66 (1977).
8. 42 N.Y.2d 109, 115, 366 N.E.2d 64, 67-68, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363, 367 (1977) (Cooke, J.,
dissenting).
9. 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977).
10. Id. at 87-88, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 114 (1977). Interestingly, the Park court was the same
one that had denied the Howard parents' cause of action for emotional pain and
suffering.
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consistent results. In some cases, courts have permitted only the parents
to bring suit, while in others both parents and defective children have
been allowed to sue." When courts have reached the question of de-
fining the duty of physicians to detect and to disclose genetic risks, the
standards promulgated have often limited inappropriately the scope of
physicians' liability.12 Finally, even cases in which liability has been
imposed have recognized differing types and measures of damages for
similar injuries.'3
This Note provides a more coherent method for analyzing such
cases. Part I discusses the process of identifying and advising prospective
parents who risk having genetically defective children so that they may
make better informed procreative choices. Part II argues that imposing
tort liability on individual physicians can best vindicate the social
interest in reducing the incidence of genetic defects; it also contends
that only causes of action asserted by parents of children with such
disorders should be sustained. Part III proposes a set of requirements,
based largely on existing tort doctrines, for upholding such causes of
action and sets forth principles for determining the measure of damages
for negligent genetic counseling by physicians.
I. Genetic Counseling and Parental Choice
A. The Nature and Predictability of Genetic Disease
Every individual's characteristics are determined in part by his
unique genetic makeup.' 4 Although most inherited traits are benign,
11. Compare Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 App. Div. 2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1977) (sus-
taining parents' cause of action for emotional distress but denying claims brought on
behalf of child with Down's Syndrome) with Park v. Chessin, 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 400
N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977) (upholding parents' claims of medical and support expenses incurred
on infant's behalf and cause of action of child born with polycystic kidney disease). See
pp. 1500-03 infra (arguing that only parents' causes of action should be recognized).
12. See notes 80 (contending that court in Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 App. Div. 2d 73, 394
N.Y.S.2d 933 (1977), unwisely rejected guidance from informed consent cases in defining
physician's duty of disclosure) & 82 (suggesting that court in Park v. Chessin, 60 App.
Div. 2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977), inappropriately restricted doctor's duty to disclose
genetic risk information) infra.
13. Compare Becker v. Schwartz, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119 (App. Div. 1977) (court awarded total
costs of raising and institutionalizing child) with Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366
N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977), aff'g 53 App. Div. 2d 420, 386 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1976)
(trial court awarded extraordinary medical and funeral expenses incurred in caring for
child with Tay-Sachs disease).
14. In many cases, of course, an affected person's environment may also be a cause of
his disorder. For example, the mental retardation normally caused by phenylketonuria
(PKU) apparently can be prevented simply by altering the diet for the first several years
of life. H. SUTTON, supra note 1, at 195-99, 480-83; see generally L. CAVALLI-SrORZA & W.
BODMER, THE GENETICS OF HUMAN POPULATIONS 508-627 (1971).
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this Note will focus only on those that are unquestionably harmful.' 5
The degree of risk for many of these deleterious traits can accurately be
defined even though the actual mechanism by which a defect produces
its effect may be obscure. 16
15. Hundreds and possibly thousands of deleterious genetic defects are known. Three
disorders that are inevitably lethal are the Tay-Sachs and polycystic kidney diseases, see
p. 1489 supra, and cystic fibrosis. P. REILLY, GENETICS, LAW, AND SOCIAL POLICY 2
(1977). Other serious but generally nonfatal genetic disorders include hemophilia; Down's
Syndrome, characterized by mental retardation and a variety of physical stigmata, see W.
NYHAN & N. SAKATI, GENETIC AND MALFORMATION SYNDROMES IN CLINICAL MEDICINE 117-23
(1976); and sickle cell anemia, a severe blood disorder punctuated by painful "sickling
crises," see Ferguson, Sickle Cell Anemia-The Neglected Disease, in SICKLE CELL ANEMIA-
THE NEGLECTED DISEASE 7-13 (F. Olafson & A. Parker eds. 1973). For a discussion of the
legal status of less harmful or even benign genetic traits, see p. 1506 & note 76 infra.
16. This risk can best be predicted for single-gene (Mendelian) traits, defined as those
exhibiting certain simple patterns of inheritance. As of 1975, more than 2000 of these
traits, including such serious disorders as hemophilia, Tay-Sachs disease, sickle cell anemia,
and Duchenne-type muscular dystrophy, had at least tentatively been identified. See V.
McKusiCK, MENDELIAN INHERITANCE IN MAN: CATALOGS OF AUTOSOMAL DOMINANT, AUTO-
SOMAL RECESSIVE, AND X-LINKED PHENOTYPES xii (4th ed. 1975). The risk of recurrence can
generally be deduced from analysis based on two overlapping pairs of categories: domi-
nance versus recessiveness and autosomal versus sex-linked. If a person with one normal and
one defective gene is affected, the altered gene is dominant; if the individual is un-
affected, the defective gene is recessive. A gene located on the X or Y chromosomes is said
to be sex-linked; genes on the non-sex chromosomes are said to be autosomal. In turn, both
dominant and recessive genes can be either autosomal or sex-linked. For examples of the
inheritance patterns that follow from these classifications, see A. EMERY, ELEMENTS OF
MEDICAL GENETICS 94-107 (3d ed. 1974); H. SUTTON, supra note 1, at 342-49.
Occasionally, a single-gene defect may be caused by a mutation in one parent's gametes
(eggs or sperm). When such an event has occurred, the risk that the disorder will reappear
in later-born siblings may be very difficult to ascertain. Where a dominant trait is so
harmful that the affected individual's ability to reproduce is either diminished or
eliminated, new mutations become the major or only source of the disorder. For a discus-
sion of the impact of new mutations generally, see W. FuHRMANN & F. VOGEL, GENETIC
COUNSELING 26-30 (2d ed. 1976); H. SUtToN, supra note 1, at 301-I1.
Polygenic disorders, those caused by the interaction of two or more genes, include
abnormalities in the early development of the neural tube, the precursor to the brain and
spinal cord, often resulting in anencephaly, an inevitably lethal trait, or spina bifida,
which may be fatal and ordinarily leads to physical handicap or, more rarely, to mental
retardation in those who survive. A. EMERY, supra at 127-28; Editorial, Screening for
Neural-tube Defects, 1 (8026) LANcEr 1345 (1977). The only basis for predicting the re-
currence of polygenic traits is inference from observed patterns of inheritance of the
disorder, a technique that is frequently inexact. It generally appears that as the number
of affected family members increases, the risk to future offspring also rises. A. EMERY,
supra at 108-11.
Gross chromosomal anomalies, variations in the number or the structure of human
chromosomes, are generally highly deleterious; an estimated 36% of all spontaneous abor-
tions result from such abnormalities. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUC. & WTELFARE, WHAT ARE THE FACTS ABOUT GENETIC DISEASE?, PUB. No. 74-370
6 (1974) [hereinafter cited as DHEW REPORT]. The risk of the structural variants is as
mathematically predictable as that of the single-gene defects. Although such anomalies
have little or no effect on the individual in whom they arise, they may pose a serious
threat of major birth defect to any of that person's children. One rare chromosome altera-
tion (called 21/21 translocation) causes Down's Syndrome in all the carrier's offspring.
IV. NYHAN & N. SAKATI, supra note 15, at 121.
The incidence of genetic defects caused by the presence of an additional chromosome,
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Until about a decade ago, methods of detecting and predicting the
occurrence of such traits were often inexact. Even when a genetic
defect appeared in the families of a couple who wished to have children,
a reliable evaluation of the risk of recurrence of the undesired trait was
seldom possible. 17 Predictions were often based solely on the pattern
of a trait's occurrence among an affected individual's family;", this
method was at times supplemented by more general population data
derived from empirical observation of other families with afflicted
relatives. 19 Unless a healthy couple had already had an affected child,
there could be no certainty of actual risks, and no means were available
to detect the presence of defects in the fetus.
Ability to forecast genetic disorders has expanded dramatically. The
mode of inheritance has been determined for an increasing number of
traits, and biochemical tests have been developed that allow more
definite preconception predictions for many types of genetic risk.20
These advances permit properly advised prospective parents to learn of
see, e.g., id. at 117-23 (Down's Syndrome), 105-08 (Trisomy 18), 154-57 (Klinefelter's
Syndrome), seems to rise with increasing maternal age. Almost 40% of the children with
Down's Syndrome are born to women over 40 years of age even though less than five
percent of all childbirths occur among such women. C. STERN, PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN
GENETICS 112-13 (3d ed. 1973). Even these women, however, individually have only a one
to two percent chance of bearing an infant with this disorder. H. SUTroN, supra note 1,
at 62-63. Yet other types of numerical chromosomal variants, such as Turner's Syndrome,
caused by the presence of only one X chromosome, show no correlation with increasing
maternal age. W. NYHAN & N. SAKATI, supra note 15, at 145; H. SuTrON, supra note 1, at
71.
17. Couples closely related by blood might also have sought out information about
genetic defects. Both consanguineous matings and prospective parents who have relatives
with genetic disorders face the possibility of elevated genetic risk because blood relatives
are likely to have some harmful recessive genes in common. The probability that any
particular gene will be shared declines as the relationship becomes more distant. See IV.
FUHRMANN & F. VOGEL, supra note 16, at 1-6, 108-15 (genetic risk posed by consanguinity
insignificant unless mates are at least first cousins).
18. The effectiveness of this type of study is limited because accurate information is
often difficult to obtain. See Fraser, Survey of Counseling Practices, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN
HUMAN GENETICS 7, 12 (B. Hilton, D. Callahan, M. Harris, P. Condliffe & B. Berkley eds.
1973) [compilation hereinafter cited as ETHICAL ISSUES].
19. This method must still be relied on when there exists no well-tested model of
heritability on which to base more definite predictions. The approach is used in analyzing
polygenic traits, many chromosomal anomalies, and other disorders in which genetic
factors may or may not be implicated. See note 16 supra. See also Nitowsky, Genetic
Counseling: Objectives, Principles, and Procedures, 19 CLINICAL OBsTETRIcs & GYNECOLOGY
919, 932 (1976). Tables listing the empirical risks of some common disorders are given in
A. EMERY, supra note 16, at 200, and W. FUHRMANN & F. VOGEL, supra note 16, at 86-88,
but such data often have limited validity. id. at 85.
20. See notes 1 & 16 supra. Even this new knowledge has not provided the explanation
for the empirically observed but nonspecific two to three percent risk of serious birth
defects at each pregnancy. Nitowsky, supra note 19, at 938. These biochemical tests can




some elements of their risk of having genetically defective children in
time to include this factor in their childbearing plans.
Recently developed technology that can accurately detec a large
number of defects in a three and one-half to four-month-old fetus
allows prospective parents at risk new freedom in deciding whether to
procreate. Amniocentesis2 1 and ultrasonography 22 are the best refined
of these techniques. Along with the newly expanded availability of
abortion, they can often allow prospective parents selectively to abort
fetuses actually afflicted with genetic disorders.2 3 Unhappily, it is at
21. In this procedure, a long needle is inserted into the mother's uterus, and a
sample of amniotic fluid containing living fetal cells is removed. These cells are then
placed in culture to grow so that further tests can be performed. W. FuHRMANN & F. VoGEL,
supra note 16, at 91-92. The sex of the fetus as well as the presence of gross chromosomal
anomalies, see note 16 supra, can be determined by karyotype analysis, a procedure in
which the number and structure of chromosomes are examined after staining at the time
of cell division. A. EMERY, supra note 16, at 54-59. Prenatal diagnosis is at least potentially
available for approximately 60 to 90 metabolic defects, including Tay-Sachs disease,
Golbus, The Antenatal Detection of Genetic Disorders, 48 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 497,
500-01 (1976); Milunsky, Prenatal Diagnosis of Genetic Disorders, 295 NEW ENG. J. MED.
377, 378 (1976), and for the neural tube defects such as anencephaly and spina bifida.
Editorial, supra note 16; United Kingdom Collaborative Study on Alpha-Fetoprotein in
Relation to Neural-Tube Defects, Maternal Serum-Alpha-Fetoprotein Measurement in
Antenatal Screening for Anencephaly and Spina Bifida in Early Pregnancy, 1 (8026) LANcEr
1323 (1977).
Recent studies indicate that amniocentesis is highly accurate and represents a combined
risk of less than one percent of complications ranging from spontaneous abortion and
fetal death to amniotic fluid leakage and maternal infection. See, e.g., NICHD National
Registry for Amniocentesis Study Group, Midtrimester Amniocentesis for Prenatal
Diagnosis, 236 J. Am. MED. A. 1471, 1472 (1976) (99.4% accuracy in 1040 cases, but even
this rate may be too low due to tragic consequences of both false positive and false nega-
tive diagnoses); Simpson, Dallaire, Miller, Siminovich, Hamerton, Miller & McKeen, Pre-
natal Diagnosis of Genetic Disease in Canada: Report of a Collaborative Study, 115
CANADIAN MED. A.J. 739 (1976) (99A% accuracy in 1223 cases).
Fetoscopy, a variant of amniocentesis involving the addition of an optical system to
permit the physician to look inside the uterus, can be used to obtain samples of fetal blood
so that the presence of various hemoglobin disorders, such as sickle cell anemia, can be
detected. See Alter, Modell, Fairweather, Hobbins, Mahoney, Frigoletto, Sherman &
Nathan, Prenatal Diagnosis of Hemoglobinopathies, 295 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1437 (1976);
Mahoney & Hobbins, Fetoscopy and Fetal Biopsy, in GENErIC COUNSELING 495 (H. Lubs &
F. de la Cruz eds. 1977) [compilation hereinafter cited as GENETIC COUNSELING].
22. The increasing sophistication in the use of ultrasound to detect anatomical ab-
normalities including such polygenic traits as the neural tube defects is particularly
desirable since the technique seems to present no discernable risk to the fetus. Hirschhorn,
Prenatal Diagnosis of Genetic Disease, in DEVELOPMENTAL GENETICS 87, 93 (C. Fenoglio, R.
Goodman & D. King eds. 1976) [compilation hereinafter cited as DEVELOPNIENTAL GENErICS].
The use of this procedure for placental localization and detection of the presence of twins
is also frequently cited as a necessary step for successful amniocentesis. See Simpson,
Dallaire, Miller, Siminovich, Hamerton, Miller & McKeen, supra note 21, at 741, 745. But
cf. NICHD Study Group, supra note 21, at 1473, 1475 (although study did not show ultra-
sound to be beneficial aid to amniocentesis, authors suggested that it might be valuable
when used properly).
23. When the feared genetic disorders are defects such as the chromosomal anomalies,
anatomical abnormalities, and a wide variety of metabolic defects that can be directly
detected ilz utero, there is very little risk that healthy fetuses will accidentally be aborted.
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present impossible to detect all genetic defects in utero,24 including the
most common genetic disease in the United States, cystic fibrosis.2 1
B. Procreative Decisionmaking in Genetic Counseling
The availability of means to determine in many cases the risk that
genetically defective children will be born adds a new dimension to
parental decisions regarding childbearing. When advised that risk
exists, prospective parents can consider this factor in choosing whether
or not to employ contraception or to seek abortion. 26 Prospective
parents, however, cannot be expected to obtain this knowledge on their
own; the risk must be detected by medical experts and effectively com-
municated to the prospective parents. In part, the function of provid-
ing genetic information has been assumed by publicly and privately
funded programs in family planning and genetic screening. 27 Gen-
erally, however, prospective parents rely on private physicians as their
first, and often sole, source of such knowledge. 28
See notes 21 & 22 supra. In some cases, however, it may be known that a woman carries a
sex-linked recessive disorder that cannot be detected in utero. Since her sons but not her
daughters have a 50% chance of being afflicted, she can avert the birth of children with
the defect by using amniocentesis to determine the sex of developing fetuses, see note 21
supra, and aborting all males. This process thus entails a 50% risk that any aborted male
was actually unaffected.
24. Indeed, the technology necessary for prenatal diagnosis is sufficiently expensive
and complex that it is ordinarily used only to test for those traits for which a fetus is
known to be at risk. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, GENETIC SCREENING: PROGRAMS,
PRINCIPLES AND RESEARCH 134 (1975) (Down's Syndrome); Editorial, supra note 16 (neural
tube defects).
25. See Editorial, Screening for Cystic Fibrosis, 1 (6061) BRIT. MED. J. 596 (1977). But
cf. P. REILLY, supra note 15, at 23, 26 (suggesting that breakthroughs are likely in both
carrier detection and prenatal diagnosis for cystic fibrosis).
26. A couple's risk of having defective children, when caused by the presence of an
altered gene in the prospective father, can be averted by using another man's sperm,
implanted by artificial insemination (AID), to fertilize the woman's ova. See P. REILLY,
supra note 15, at 190-221; Lubs, Artificial Insemination, in GENETIC COUNSELING, supra
note 21, at 573.
27. A wide variety of public health professionals working in family planning and
prenatal and mother-child health care programs often refer clients who are concerned
about the possibility of genetic defects to local genetics clinics. See Naylor, Genetic Screen-
ing and Genetic Counseling: Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practices in Two Groups of
Family Planning Professionals, 22 Soc. BIOLOGY 304, 313 (1975). In a growing number of
clinics and programs dealing specifically with human genetics, genetics associates who
have participated in masters' degree programs in genetics and counseling techniques, social
workers, and nurses are providing the actual counseling once the nature of the prospective
parents' genetic risk is clear. See P. REILLY, supra note 15, at 161-62, 175-82 (with in-
creasing demand for genetic counseling, four genetic associates may be required for each
physician-medical geneticist practicing in 1985); Lubs & Lubs, Changing Patterns of
Genetic Counseling, in DEVELOPMENTAL GENETICS, supra note 22, at 102, 115 (discussing
diversity of backgrounds of nonphysician personnel); see generally note 66 infra (standard
of care to be exercised by such personnel).
28. See Fraser, Genetics as a Health-Care Service, 295 NEw ENG. J. MED. 486 (1976);
Kushnick, When to Refer to the Geneticist, 235 J. Am. MeD. A. 623 (1976); Rowley,
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Genetic counseling involves informing prospective parents about
both the nature of their genetic risks and the way in which such knowl-
edge can be integrated into their procreative plans. Educating prospec-
tive parents about such possibilities presents peculiar difficulties, in
part due to the need to convey technical information..2 0 Additional
problems arise in determining how far counselors should go in direct-
ing prospective parents toward a particular procreative choiceY0 The
counselors' views may be colored not only by their subjective percep-
tions of the particular genetic disorders, but also by a tendency to
emphasize the social impact of defective children, both as a present
burden on health-care resources and as a possible contribution to the
future deterioration of society's genetic composition3 1 In contrast,
prospective parents ordinarily place greater weight on the potential
Genetic Screening: Whose Responsibility?, 236 J. Am. MED. A. 374 (1976); cf. Gordis, Childs
& Roseman, Obstetricians' Attitudes toward Genetic Screening, 67 Am. J PuB. HEALTH 469
(1977) (suggesting that even use of public genetic screening programs may significantly be
affected by attitudes of private physicians). But see note 41 infra (old-time family doctor
who knows patients intimately no longer typical of medical practice).
29. The inability of prospective parents to grasp the likelihood of and the physical
and emotional burden associated with a given defect is often a fundamental barrier to
genetic counseling. Griffin, Kavanagh & Sorenson, Genetic Knowledge, Client Perspectives,
and Genetic Counseling, 2 Soc. WORK IN HEALTH CARE 171, 174 (1976-1977); Leonard, Chase
& Childs, Genetic Counseling: A Consumers' View, 287 NEw ENG. J. AIM. 433, 438 (1972).
Thus part of the counselor's efforts may include teaching the prospective parents some
basic concepts of probability and human biology and genetics. Yet when, due to the birth
of a defective child, parents have sought genetic counseling, the counselor must often help
them cope with their emotional shock before he can even begin to explain the technical
nature of their genetic risk. Otherwise, the parents' distress may make them totally un-
receptive to the genetic information being given. Antley, Variables in the Outcome of
Genetic Counseling, 23 Soc. BIOLOGY 108, 113 (1976); Griffin, Kavanagh S- Sorenson, supra
at 174-75.
30. Compare Capron, Informed Decisionmaking in Genetic Counseling: A Dissent to
the "Wrongful Life" Debate, 48 IND. L.J. 581, 603 (1973) (counselor should give prospective
parents sufficient information to place them in "position of informed decisionmakers")
and Waltz & Thigpen, Genetic Screening and Counseling: the Legal and Ethical Issues,
68 Nw. L. REV. 696, 735-36 (1973) (same) with Motulsky, Brave New World?, 185 SCIENCE
653, 657 (1974) (citing Professor Childs on personal communication) (prospective parents
may often want advice about desirability of procreation) and Shaw, Genetic Counseling,
184 SCIENCE 751 (1974) (counselors are advocates for what they perceive to be "best"
procreative choice). Some counselors who espouse parental autonomy may nonetheless
structure, often unconsciously, their presentation of genetic information to influence
prospective parents toward what the counselor perceives as the "right" procreative choice.
Sorenson, Sociological and Psychological Factors in Applied Human Genetics, in ETHICAL
IsSUEs, supra note 18, at 283, 295-96; see W. FUHRMANN & F. VOGEL, supra note 16, at 126
(impossibility of complete objectivity).
31. P. REILLY, supra note 15, at 157-59 (discussing survey of hundreds of genetic
counselors showing that many consider such factors as "the possible societal burden of
the defective child," possible dysgenic effects of couple's procreation, and their own
perception of burden of defect on individual and family). Contra, Motulsky, supra note
30, at 657 ("[M]ost counselors do not attempt to give advice based on considerations of
the gene pool.") Studies have shown that the predicted degeneration of the gene pool will
generally be minimal for the foreseeable future. See H. SuTrroN, supra note I, at 471-73;
Crow, Population Perspective, in ETHICAL Issuas, supra note 18, at 73, 76-79.
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impact on their families by balancing a desire for children against their
understanding of the burden of caring for a defective child.32
Genetic counseling by physicians or other personnel exists within a
general framework of parental autonomy since the prospective parents
will bear the consequences of their procreative choices. Observations
that prospective parents often choose against procreation when they
believe that their children might be seriously defective 33 suggest that
ensuring the flow of genetic risk information will also reduce the social
burden of genetic disease. However, the clarification of choices and
values encouraged by the counseling process and, indeed, the possibility
of action to avoid the birth of defective children are entirely lost when,
through the negligence of physicians, genetic risks are not detected and
communicated to prospective parents.
II. The Imposition of Tort Liability When Doctors Have Inade-
quately Informed Parents About Their Genetic Risk
A. -The Case for a Medical Malpractice Approach
Genetic defects represent an increasingly large part of the overall
national health care burden.34 For the individual, his family, and
society as a whole, the cost of medical care for persons afflicted with
these defects is enormous.35 In addition, the emotional impact on the
32. See Lebel, Responsibility in Genetic Decisions, 1 BIOETHIcs NORTHWEST 4 (1977)
(suggesting that both personal and societal factors are considered by prospective parents);
cf. Griffin, Kavanagh & Sorenson, supra note 29, at 175-76 (prospective parents may also
face problems in learning to use birth control and adjusting their desires for more
children). The disclosure of genetic risk information by physicians should be governed by
what reasonable prospective parents would want to know in making their procreative
decisions. See pp. 1506-08 infra.
33. P. REILLY, supra note 15, at 23; Antley, supra note 29, at 110. Presumably, prospec-
tive parents warned of a risk of genetic defect before the birth of an afflicted child would
also weigh carefully the severity of the disorder although the emotional impact of the
risk, as opposed to the reality of a defective child, is likely to be much less. Cf. Leonard,
Chase & Childs, supra note 29, at 437 (parents of children afflicted with nongenetic but
highly burdensome defects often choose against further procreation even though there is
no particular risk that defect will recur in afterborn children).
34. Although genetic defects are increasingly important as a source of ill health in
people of all ages, this is particularly noticeable in diseases of the young. It has been
estimated that slightly less than 20% of all pediatric hospitalizations, see Day & Holmes,
The Incidence of Genetic Disease in a University Hospital Population, 25 Am. J. HUIAN
GENETICS 237, 245 (1973), and over 40% of all childhood deaths, see P. REILLY, supra note
15, at 15-16, are caused at least in part by genetic factors.
35. The cost of treatment for a hemophiliac can run to $12,000 per year. See House
REPORT, supra note 3, at 727. It costs $20,000 to $40,000 per year to care for a child
afflicted with Tay-Sachs disease until his death. Id. Often, the treatment required is not
only expensive but also extremely unpleasant to the child. The diet necessary during early
childhood for a person with PKU to prevent severe mental retardation, see note 14 supra,
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family of the birth of a defective child can be devastating. 6
Since there is no effective treatment for most genetic defects, 37 con-
trol of genetic disease may be achieved only by preventing the birth of
children with these disorders.38 Recently, the social interest in avoiding
a relatively minor intervention, costs from $8,000 to $16,000 per year, see DHEW REPORT,
supra note 16, at 27, and its taste and smell have caused it to be described as a "really
miserable" regimen. L. AUGENSTEIN, COME, LET Us PLAY GOD 27 (1969).
Although it is difficult to assess accurately the overall economic burden of genetic
defects, see NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 24, at 200-12, the annual cost of
caring just for all persons afflicted with Down's Syndrome has been estimated to be at
least one billion dollars. See HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 727; P. REILLY, supra note
15, at 18.
36. The desire to have children is often deeply ingrained, and most prospective parents
never seriously anticipate the possibility that their child might be stricken with birth
defects. Antley, supra note 29, at 112-15. Consequently, the birth of such a child often
causes the parents to feel "shock and denial, anxiety, anger and/or guilt, and depression."
Griffin, Kavanagh & Sorenson, supra note 29, at 174, 177 (citing Faleck g- Britton, Phases
in Coping: The Hypothesis and Its Implications, 21 Soc. BIOLOGY 1 (1974)); see Blumberg,
Golbus & Hanson, The Psychological Sequelae of Abortion Performed for a Genetic In-
dication, 122 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 799, 806 (1975).
37. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 727-28; P. REILLY, supra note 15, at 22; Motulsky,
supra note 30, at 659. The types of available treatments are summarized in A. EMERY,
supra note 16, at 206, Table XXIII.
38. P. REILLY, supra note 15, at 22-26; cf. Motulsky, supra note 30, at 662 (selective
abortion rather than gene therapy will necessarily be major approach to prevention of
birth defects for foreseeable future).
An early response was state legislation in the first part of this century compelling the
sterilization of persons thought likely to have children with disorders such as "idiocy" and
"criminality." See, e.g., Act of April 16, 1912, ch. 445, 1912 N.Y. LAws 924, 925 (authorizing
sterilization if person's children would have "an inherited tendency to crime, insanity,
feeble-mindedness, idiocy or imbecility"; law invalidated in Osborn v. Thomson, 103
Misc. 23, 169 N.Y.S. 638 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 185 App. Div. 902, 171 N.Y.S. 1094 (1918)). In
many cases, the individual to be sterilized did not receive even minimal procedural rights
such as notice or a hearing. Shaw, Procreation and the Population Problem, 55 N.C.L.
REv. 1165, 1181 n.119 (1977).
Although these early laws were occasionally invalidated by courts, see, e.g., Davis v.
Berry, 216 F. 413 (S.D. Iowa 1914), vacated as moot, 242 U.S. 468 (1917) (vasectomy is
cruel and unusual punishment); Osborn v. Thomson, 103 Misc. 23, 169 N.Y.S. 638 (Sup.
Ct.), aff'd, 185 App. Div. 902, 171 N.Y.S. 1094 (1918) (denial of equal protection to
sterilize only those who are in confinement), the Supreme Court upheld Virginia's
eugenic sterilization law in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (statute mandated extensive
procedural protection). The Court reasoned that "society can prevent those who are
manifestly unfit from continuing their kind." Id. at 207. The result reached in Buck has
been tacitly affirmed by the Supreme Court as recently as 1973, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 154 (1973). Yet the use of involuntary sterilization has waned. See P. REILLY, supra
note 15, at 126 (decline beginning in mid-1950s). Indeed, it has been determined that
many socially undesirable traits are not inherited. Lederberg, State Channeling of Gene
Flow by Regulation of Marriage and Procreation, in GENETICS AND THE LAW 247, 261-62
(A. Milunsky & G. Annas eds. 1976) (much mental retardation caused by nongenetic
factors; even heritable forms only rarely preventable by eugenic sterilization laws); Shaw,
supra at 1182-83. Findings of nonheritability have been cited as a reason for declaring
eugenic compulsory sterilization statutes to be unconstitutional. See Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535, 542 (1942) (striking down law mandating sterilization of persons convicted
of some but not all types of felonies on ground that statutory distinction had no "signifi-
cance in eugenics" and was therefore in violation of equal protection). Although the
Skinner Court explicitly distinguished Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), on the ground
that the operations validated in Buch might enable a previously institutionalized person
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genetic disorders has been served by taking steps to ensure that prospec-
tive parents are advised about their genetic risk. One trend has been
the establishment of federal and state screening programs based on
voluntary participation by adults to detect carriers of specific harmful
traits.39 Yet economic reality dictates that such screening programs
can never become the primary source of genetic risk information. Their
usefulness is limited to testing for predictable defects that occur rela-
tively frequently within some easily defined target population.40
to return to society, dicta throughout Skinner suggested that the Court would have up-
held a statute that provided for the sterilization only of those persons who were likely to
have children with genetic defects. Id. at 542, 544 (Stone, C.J., concurring), 546 (Jackson,
J., concurring).
39. The present programs and future prospects for screening to detect carriers of
genetic defects are discussed at length in NATIONAL ACALDEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 24,
at 116-223; P. REILLY, supra note 15, at 62-120. In 1976, Congress passed an omnibus bill
entitled the National Sickle Cell Anemia, Cooley's Anemia, Tay-Sachs and Genetic
Diseases Act providing federal funds to support state and local carrier detection programs
and to set up screening and counseling within the Public Health Service. Pub. L. No. 94-
278, 90 Stat. 407 (1976) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300b to 300b-5 (West Supp. 1977)). Mary-
land has also passed a far-reaching genetic diseases act. Commission of Hereditary Disorders
Act, 1973 Md. Laws 231, 695 (codified at 43 MD. CODE ANN. §§ 814-821 (Supp. 1977)).
California has recently approved a bill providing for a two-year pilot program for out-
reach in nondirective genetic counseling. 1977 Cal. Legis. Serv. 215. Tay-Sachs screening
has generally been undertaken on the local level in more than 50 major cities throughout
the nation. See Kaback, Detection of Tay-Sachs Disease Carriers: Lessons and Ramifica-
tions, in GENETIC COUNSELING, supra note 21, at 203-04. Recently, however, three states
have begun providing support for these programs. See P. REILLY, supra note 15, at 110-11.
Screening programs for sickle cell anemia and sickle cell trait are statutorily mandated in
seventeen states. Id. at 85, Table 5 (listing statutory provisions). As of 1977, 10 of these
laws called for mandatory participation by blacks, although some allowed religious ex-
emptions, and only 11 mentioned providing counseling to persons found to have the
defective gene. Id.
Screening programs for certain groups of pregnant women have also been suggested.
Under one proposal, the blood level of alpha-fetoprotein would be measured in all women
who are 16 to 18 weeks pregnant to detect fetuses probably afflicted with neural tube
defects. See Editorial, Diagnostic Amniocentesis in Early Pregnancy, 1 (6074) BRaIT. MED. J.
1430 (1977); Editorial, supra note 16; notes 21-22 supra (techniques to confirm presence of
such abnormalities).
Since the risk of many chromosomal anomalies increases with advancing maternal age,
see note 16 supra, programs offering amniocentesis to older pregnant women have been
proposed, see NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 24, at 135, and, in a few instances,
partially implemented. P. REILLY, supra note 15, at 116-18.
40. Screening programs for the Tay-Sachs gene have been limited to Ashkenazi
(Eastern European) Jews and those for the sickle cell gene to blacks, groups in which
these genes are present in relatively high frequency. See H. SUTTON, supra note 1, at 484;
Annas 9- Coyne, "Fitness" for Birth and Reproduction: Legal Implications of Genetic
Screening, 9 FAm. L.Q. 463, 483-84 (1975). Because the sickle cell gene is also common
among some other populations, the racial orientation of programs screening for that trait
has resulted in the allegation that their true purpose is one of black genocide. See id. at
485. Screening programs for Down's Syndrome and other chromosomal anomalies, see note
39 supra, can be justified only when limited to pregnant women over the age of 35 years.
Thus restricted, the cost of the necessary amniocentesis surveys is much lower than the
cost of medical care and institutionalization that would otherwise be required. See notes
16 & 35 supra
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Due to the limitations of these screening programs, private physicians
will continue to be the principal providers of genetic information.
Indeed, where prospective parents have a personal doctor,41 his famil-
iarity with them may make him uniquely qualified to detect and convey
facts regarding the possibility of genetic defects.42 Yet, as in other areas
of medical practice, a doctor may neglect the need to provide adequate
genetic counseling.43 Tort law, a well-recognized means of regulating
the practice of medicine, 44 can be used both to establish and to limit
the duty of physicians to fulfill this function. Under such a system, a
doctor whose negligence results in the birth of a genetically defective
child would be liable for compensatory damages.45
41. Intimate knowledge of patients and their families is no lodger the norm of medical
practice. Indeed, many people, especially among poor and non-Caucasian populations,
receive much of their medical care from hospital outpatient clinics and emergency rooms.
See HEALTH RESOURCES AD., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE PUBLIC HEALTH
SE~vicE, HEALTH UNITED STATES 1975, Pub. No. 76-1232, at 293, 503 (1976). Even doctors
who work in such facilities should be responsible for detecting certain types of genetic
risk. See pp. 1504-06 infra. If necessary, they can and should refer prospective parents at
risk to other physicians or genetics clinics for further testing and counseling.
42. See, e.g., Kushnick, supra note 28, at 624; Valentine, The Reproductive Counseling
Process: Contments Based on Experience, 16 CLINICAL PEDIATRICS 233, 238 (1977).
43. For cases alleging physician negligence, see Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 110,
366 N.E.2d 64, 66, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363, 365 (1977) (doctor failed to warn prospective parents
of 25% risk of Tay-Sachs disease); Park v. Chessin, 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110
(1977) (physicians had negligently informed parents of child with polycystic kidney disease
that there was no significant risk that their future children would have this disorder).
44. One of the purposes often ascribed to tort law is general deterrence, the imposition
of liability to create incentives in the direction of socially desirable behavior. See, e.g., G.
CALABRESi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 73-75 (1970); 2 F. HARPER - F. JAMES, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 11.5, at 742-43 (1956); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 4, at 23
(4th ed. 1971). Physician behavior may be shaped in part by articles discussing significant
malpractice decisions that regularly appear in literature readily accessible to the medical
community. See, e.g., Curran, Tay-Sachs Disease, Wrongful Life, and Preventive Mal-
practice, 67 Am. J. PuB. HEALTH 568 (1977) (analyzing Howard v. Lecher, 53 App. Div. 2d
420, 386 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1976), aff'd 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977),
and Park v. Chessin, 88 Misc. 2d 222, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. 1976), aff'd 60 App. Div.
2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977)); Curran, The Proper and Improper Concerns of Medical
Law and Ethics, 295 Nmw ENG. J. MED. 1057 (1976) (from regular column entitled "Law-
Medicine Notes"). Professor Posner, however, objects to the use of tort law as a means of
regulating medical practice on the ground that it encourages less than optimal activities.
R. POSNER, ECONOmic ANALYSIS OF LAw 157-59 (2d ed. 1977).
Direct governmental regulation might provide another way to shape the behavior of
physicians. A governmental agency may be slow to respond to changing conditions, how-
ever, an occurrence that would be highly problematic in regulating a rapidly expanding
discipline such as human genetics. Moreover, such an approach would not provide compen-
sation for the parties harmed by a physician's failure to give genetic counseling. Such
considerations support a conclusion that tort law may be the appropriate method of
governing medical practice.
45. Compensation of persons harmed by tortfeasors has been described as the primary
purpose of tort law. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 44, § 25.1, at 1299-1303; see D.
DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.1, at 135-38 (1973); W. PROSSER, supra note
44, § 1, at 6.
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B. The Standing to State a Claim
In the past, courts have been inconsistent in their willingness to
recognize various causes of action based on allegedly negligent genetic
counseling.46 Yet tort law can provide neither deterrence nor com-
pensation unless it is possible for at least some of the injured parties to
bring valid suits.
1. "Wrongful Life"-The Child's Claim
A wrongful life claim4 7 is a cause of action on behalf of a defective
child asserting that he would have been better off had he never been
born, thus characterizing the fact of his existence as "wrongful."4 8 Few
courts have been willing to recognize such claims. 49 Although courts
46. There are six reported cases analyzing a physician's failure to warn of the possible
occurrence of genetic defects. See Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397
N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977) (Tay-Sachs disease; cause of action for parents' emotional pain and
suffering denied on appeal); Johnson v. Yeshiva Univ., 42 N.Y.2d 818, 364 N.E.2d 1340,
396 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1977) (no liability for failure to detect cri-du-chat syndrome); Park v.
Chessin, 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977) (polycystic kidney disease; causes of
action upheld for loss of wife's services and for child's pain and suffering and medical
expenses); Becker v. Schwartz, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119 (App. Div. 1977) (disorder unnamed;
sustaining all causes of action asserted by parents and child except those involving emo-
tional distress); Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 App. Div. 2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1977) (Down's
Syndrome; sustaining cause of action for parents' mental anguish); Greenberg v. Kliot, 47
App. Div. 2d 765, 367 N.Y.S.2d 966, appeal denied, 37 N.Y.2d 707, 337 N.E.2d 618, 375
N.Y.S.2d 1026 (1975) (mem.) (facts summarized in Park v. Chessin, 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 93,
400 N.Y.S.2d 110, 116-18 (1977) (Titone, J., dissenting)) (Down's Syndrome; denying claim
brought on child's behalf).
47. The terminology used to describe the various causes of action in cases involving the
birth of defective children and in those in which a child is born due to failure of con-
traception or abortion is extremely confused. See Kass & Shaw, supra note 2, at 226 n.55
(discussing some of these formulations). To avoid this quagmire, the term "wrongful life"
will be used here to refer only to the child's claim. No special designation will be created
to refer to the parents' claims.
48. This cause of action is predicated on the theory that had the parents known of
their genetic risk, they would have chosen to use abortion or contraception to prevent the
birth of that child. Because prospective parents can be expected to consider the burden
borne by a genetically defective child in making their decision not to procreate, it is
plausible that the affected child's injury was caused by his parents' lack of genetic risk
information.
49. Greenberg v. Kliot, 47 App. Div. 2d 765, 367 N.Y.S.2d 966, appeal denied, 37 N.Y.2d
707, 337 N.E.2d 618, 375 N.Y.S.2d 1026 (1975) (mem.) (facts summarized in Park v.
Chessin, 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 93, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110, 116-18 (1977) (Titone, J., dissenting))
(child born with Down's Syndrome due to alleged failure to perform amniocentesis);
Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 App. Div. 2d 73, 79-81, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933, 937-38 (1977) (Down's
Syndrome); Speck v. Finegold, No. GD 76-07752, at 20 (Ct. C.P., Allegheny Cty., Pa., July
21, 1976) (child born with neurofibromatosis after failure of both vasectomy and abortion);
Dumer v. Saint Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 771-73, 233 N.W.2d 372, 374-76 (1975)
(rubella); Note, Torts Prior to Conception: A New Theory of Liability, supra note 2, at
714 n.40 (citing cases); Note, 13 WAKE Forsr L. REV. 712, 712 n.5, 716 n.27 (1977) (citing
cases). Contra, Park v. Chessin, 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977) (failure to warn
parents that child might have polycystic kidney disease is injury to child); Becker v.
Schwartz, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119 (App. Div. 1977) (unnamed disorder).
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have often relied on the difficulty of measuring damages to justify their
refusal to make awards in such cases,50 this explanation may mask a
more fundamental judicial disbelief that such children have actually
been injured by being born.51
In Park v. Chessin, -52 a court sustained a cause of action brought on
behalf of a child born with polycystic kidney disease to recover for her
"injuries and conscious pain and suffering,"5" a measure of damages
apparently reflecting the inaccurate assumption that she could have
been born healthy.54 Notwithstanding the court's holding in Park, a
50. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 28-29, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (1967), relied on the
argument made by a commentator that " 'no comparison is possible since were it not for
the act of birth the infant would not exist. By his cause of action, the plaintiff cuts from
under himself the ground upon which he needs to rely in order to prove his damage.'" Id.
(quoting Tedeschi, On Tort Liability for "Wrongful Life", 1 IsRAEL L. REV. 513, 529
(1966)). For other cases that use this argument, see Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 App. Div. 2d
73, 80-81, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933, 937-38 (1977); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 SAV.2d 846, 849 (Tex.
1975). But see Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. at 50-51, 227 A.2d at 704 (Jacobs, J., dissent-
ing) (lack of logically definable damages should not bar compensation for child's defects);
Park v. Chessin, 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 87-88, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110, 114 (1977) (rejecting argu-
ment that child's damages unmeasurable).
51. The majority in Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 30, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (1967), ex-
pressed their "felt intuition" that had they been able to ask the Gleitman child, who was
severely defective in sight, speech, and hearing, whether he would rather have been
aborted, "he would almost surely [have chosen] life with defects as against no life at all."
Id. They went on to observe that a number of people had attained "great achievement"
in spite of physical handicaps and concluded that a "child need not be perfect to have a
worthwhile life." Id.
52. 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977).
53. Id. at 88; 400 App. Div. 2d at 114. The court found that the denial of the parents'
right to abortion may "be tortious to the fundamental right of a child to be born as a
whole, functional human being." Id. Given the characteristics of Lara Park's defect, it was
at least plausible that her life was in fact worse than nonexistence and thus a detriment
to her. Infantile polycystic kidney disease is an inevitably lethal trait manifested by grossly
enlarged and basically nonfunctional kidneys and by facial stigmata. See M. SUCH.STON &
M. CANNON, CONGENITAL MALFORMATIONS 197-202 (1973). The first child born to the Parks
died of this disorder within five hours of birth while the plaintiff second-born child
lingered for two and one-half years. Park v. Chessin, 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 83, 400 N.Y.S.2d
110, 111 (1977).
54. See note 53 supra. Such a postulate would be valid in prenatal injury cases claiming
that tortfeasors' acts had harmed healthy fetuses. See, e.g., Dillon v. S.S. Kresge Co., 35
Mich. App. 603, 192 NAV.2d 661 (1971) (mem.) (unsanitary working conditions had al-
legedly caused maternal rubella, thereby injuring unborn child); Sylvia v. Gobeille, 101
R.I. 76, 220 A.2d 222 (1966) (child's injuries from maternal rubella caused by doctor's
failure to prescribe preventive measures after mother had been exposed but before she
had developed disease). In such cases, the measure of damages, as is generally true in
instances of personal injury, is the difference between the benefits and burdens of the
lives that the affected children will lead and those of the lives that they otherwise would
have led. This may often be approximated by the prenatally injured children's physical
and emotional pain and suffering. By contrast, children with genetic disorders are defective
from the moment of conception. The only alternative to their suffering, and thus the
standard against which their compensation must be determined, is no life at all. See note
50 supra.
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policy of denying wrongful life claims is appropriate.5 5 Even if precise
determinations of damages were possible, such claims in effect allow
the children to assert that they would have been better off dead than
alive, a statement that contradicts deeply held beliefs in the value of
life that, despite some contrary signs," , remain strong. 5 7
2. The Parents' Cause of Action
Whatever the resolution of the wrongful life issue, the parents of
genetically defective children should, in some cases, be permitted to
assert claims for damages.55 When doctors' negligence deprives prospec-
55. The majority of legal commentators does not favor awarding damages for such
causes of action. See, e.g., Tedesehi, supra note 50; Comment, Liability for Failure of
Birth Control Methods, 76 COLUm. L. REV. 1187, 1201 n.76 (1976); Comment, supra note 2.
For commentary arguing that courts should uphold wrongful life claims, see Friedman,
Legal Implications of Amniocentesis, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 92, 148-55 (1974); Note, A Cause
of Action for "Wrongful Life": [A Suggested Analysis], 55 MINN. L. REV. 58, 80-81 (1970).
56. The debate about euthanasia and its basic assumption that there may, in fact, be
times when life is not worth living indicates that this citadel is under attack. Although
the increasing sophistication of medicine can now prevent the death of many severely
defective children, the "rescue" may be so incomplete that the children are at best less
than healthy. As a result, there have been suggestions that parents should be able to
deny extraordinary medical care to certain of these newborns who face very poor prog-
noses even with treatment. See, e.g., Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk: On
State Supervention of Parental Autonomy, 86 YALE L.J. 645, 654-58 (1977); Note, Birth-
Defective Infants: A Standard for Nontreatment Decisions, 30 STAN. L. REV. 599 (1978);
see also In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976) (guardian of critically ill person can
choose not to have extraordinary medical care when treatment involves extensive bodily
invasion and poor prognosis for improvement). Quinlan does not compel recognition of
the wrongful life claim. It recognized a qualified right of an incompetent person to have
life support efforts terminated. The wrongful life claim goes far beyond this limited
holding. In it, the child demands compensation from another for the very fact of being
born.
57. See, e.g., Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 58 Misc. 2d 432, 436, 296 NY.S.2d
41, 46 (Sup. Ct. 1968), modified, 35 App. Div. 2d 531, 531, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (1970),
aff'd mem., 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d 616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972) (prolife bias of tort law
cited in holding that plaintiff-child had no cause of action against doctor who failed to
perform abortion). Although only three states have laws making attempts to take one's
own life illegal, see Comment, State ex rel. Swann v. Pack: Self-Endangerment and the
First Amendment, 65 Ky. L.J. 195, 200 n.29 (1976), many states have enacted statutes that
make aiding and abetting such acts unlawful. See Schwartz, Civil Liability for Causing
Suicide: A Synthesis of Law and Psychiatry, 24 VAND. L. REV. 217, 220 n.24 (1971).
58. Prospective parents may also be harmed when, in reliance on incorrect information
that they risk having children with genetic defects, they decided to undergo contraceptive
sterilization or abortion. False positive diagnoses have been made even when amniocen-
tesis, a highly accurate technique, has been used. See NICHD Study Group, supra note
21, at 1472; Simpson, Dallaire, Miller, Siminovich, Hamerton, Miller & McKeen, supra
note 21, at 744. As a practical matter, it seems unlikely that such prospective parents would
discover that they had been misled, but if they did, they might well decide to bring suit
against the source of the erroneous warning. Yet even if they could show that the mistake
had been one of negligence, they might encounter serious difficulties in attempting to
prove the extent of their injury. Where prospective parents had opted for sterilization,
they presumably would need to substantiate the number of children they otherwise would
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tive parents of opportunities to avert the birth of defective children,
parents suffer both economic and emotional injury.5 9 Until 1975, ap-
pellate courts, relying on the difficulty of measuring the parents'
alleged injuries 0° refused to permit recovery on the parents' claims. Yet
the elements of their requests for damages-economic costs6' and emo-
tional distress 2-are regularly treated in other areas of tort law. 63
have had, a seemingly insurmountable burden of proof. Although it might appear that
misguided decisions to abort would result in damages that would be more restricted but
easier to measure if one assumes that the prospective parents could and would go on to
have more children, such an assumption may not always be valid, especially for older
women, see, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 65, 227 A.2d 689, 712 (1967) (Wein-
traub, C.J., dissenting in part). Whatever may be the appropriate way to measure such
elements of damages, misinformed prospective parents should be permitted to recoup the
economic and emotional costs of undergoing the unnecessary sterilization or abortion.
Evidence suggests that at least selective abortion can be an emotionally shattering ex-
perience. See Blumberg, Golbus & Hanson, supra note 36.
59. See pp. 1496-97 supra. Of course, the elements necessary to sustain a cause of action,
see pp. 1504-10 infra, must be present before any damages can be awarded.
60. See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 29-30, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (1967);
Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 35 App. Div. 2d 531, 532, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503-04
(1970), rev'g 58 Misc. 2d 432, 296 N.Y.S.2d 41 (Sup. Ct. 1968), afj'd inern., 30 N.Y.2d 695,
283 N.E.2d 616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972); see also Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124, 128
(Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1973) (writ refused; no reversible error), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927
(1974) (child born after failure of tubal ligation; impossibility of measuring intangible
benefits of parenthood).
61. Courts have often allowed damages for economic injury to parents who bear a
healthy child as a result of contraceptive failure. Among the elements of damages re-
covered in such cases are the medical expenses incurred in obtaining the ineffective
sterilization and caused by the ensuing pregnancy, e.g., Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d
757, 761 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974), aff'd, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975), the economic loss associated
with the birth and rearing of the child less any joy or benefit that the child might bring to
the parents, e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 255, 260-61, 187 N.W.2d 511, 518,
520-21 (1971), and that amount of money needed to "replenish the family exchequer" so
that other family members would not be economically injured by the birth of an unex-
pected child, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 323-24, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 476-77
(1967).
A number of courts, however, have explicitly refused to allow recovery of the costs of
childrearing in these circumstances. See, e.g., Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8, 11-14 (Del.
1975); Hays v. Hall, 477 S.W.2d 402, 406 (rex. Ct. Civ. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 488
S.W.2d 412 (Tex. 1972).
62. Although emotional distress damages have not been awarded for the birth of a
healthy child following contraceptive failure, they are given in a wide variety of contexts.
See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 382-84, 334 N.E.2d 590, 592-93, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638,
642-43 (1975) (plaintiff allowed to recover damages for her emotional trauma caused by
being negligently and incorrectly informed that her mother had died); Clemm v. Atchison,
T. & S.F. Ry., 126 Kan. 181, 268 P. 103 (1928) (compensating mental anguish and con-
sequent physical injuries resulting from railroad's negligent delay in shipment of corpse).
63. The economic and emotional impact of the birth of a defective child can also
represent a significant injury to any prior-born children. Although courts have occasion-
ally been willing to compensate a family as a unit for the economic burden imposed by
the birth of an unplanned but healthy child, see, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App.
2d 303, 323-25, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 476-77 (1967), they have uniformly rejected any causes of
action brought solely on behalf of such a child's siblings. See, e.g., Aronoff v. Snider, 292
So. 2d 418, 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Cox v. Stretton, 77 Misc. 2d 155, 158-60, 352
N.Y.S.2d 834, 839-41 (Sup. Ct. 1974). This judicial attitude suggests that the siblings of a
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III. The Standards of Liability in Tort
A. Defining the Cause of Action
Existing cases give inadequate guidance on the necessary elements
of a cause of action for parents of genetically defective children. 64 Draw-
ing on traditional tort doctrines relating to the medical standard of
care and the requirement of proximate cause, 5 this section offers
criteria for use by the courts.
1. The Medical Practitioner-The Duty to Detect the
Risk of Genetic Disorders
An appropriate standard of care for genetic counseling by a physician
should measure both the sufficiency of the steps taken to detect genetic
risks and the amount and accuracy of information provided to prospec-
tive parents. The first component pertains to the degree of medical
skill exercised by the physician. 6 The standard traditionally imposed
is the degree of care exercised by other practitioners possessing a similar
degree of skill and knowledge.07 Measured by this standard, a physician
who either failed to employ or inadequately executed tests commonly
performed to ascertain the likelihood of genetic defects should be found
genetically defective child should similarly be denied any individual awards of damages.
They probably would have had no part in making their parents' procreative decision even
had the genetic risk information been conveyed, and, from the perspective of deterrence,
so long as the parents receive compensation, the recognition of the siblings' claims would
likely do little to enhance the general availability of genetic counseling.
64. See, e.g., notes 80 & 82 infra.
65. See generally 1 D. LOuiSELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRAClICE 194-217 (1977)
(essential elements of typical case in medical malpractice).
66. Although medical expertise is clearly necessary both for prenatal diagnosis, see
p. 1493 and notes 21-22 supra, and for full use of a person's individual and family
medical histories and of empirically derived data, see pp. 1492, 1499 supra, people who
are not physicians can be trained to screen, at least initially, for certain elevated risks of
genetic defect. The care that such personnel would be required to exercise in this type of
risk detection would almost certainly be less than that required of a doctor.
67. See 1 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 65, at 200-06. A classic formulation
was given in Zoterell v. Repp, 187 Mich. 319, 330, 153 N.W. 692, 696 (1915) (physician
must "bring and apply to the case in hand that degree of skill, care, knowledge, and
attention ordinarily possessed and exercised by practitioners of the medical profession
under like circumstances"). One effect of this rule has been that medical specialists
acting within their specialties have been held to a higher level of treatment than that
required of nonspecialists. See, e.g., Robbins v. Footer, 553 F.2d 123 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(obstetrician); Naccarato v. Grob, 384 Mich. 248, 180 N.W.2d 788 (1970) (pediatrician). Many
of the cases based on failure to warn a pregnant woman that the fetus she was carrying
might be defective were brought against obstetricians. See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49
N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967) (rubella); Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64,
397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977) (Tay-Sachs disease); see also Park v. Chessin, 88 Misc. 2d 222, 387
N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. 1976), afj'd, 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977) (failure to
warn prior to conception about risk of polycystic kidney disease).
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negligent. 68 Because an obstetrician in his practice attempts to ensure,
insofar as possible, that children will be born healthy, he should be
expected to exercise greater care in detecting such risks in unborn or
unconceived children than should a general practitioner or a specialist
in another discipline. All specialists, however, should be knowledgeable
about the genetic disorders that arise in their practice.6 9
When applied to a developing field of medical practice like genetic
counseling, this rule may unduly limit physicians' liability. Because
knowledge of human genetics is expanding rapidly, doctors should not
be exonerated when they have failed to keep reasonably current in this
area.7 0 It has long been recognized that physicians are bound to stay
abreast of major medical developments, particularly those relating to
areas of their special expertise r.7  In evaluating the adequacy of
physicians' detection of genetic risk, courts should go beyond the limits
of this traditional requirement by strictly compelling doctors to be
aware at least of techniques widely known within the medical com-
munity. The number of reports in the medical literature and the cir-
culation of the journals in which they appear should be primary in-
dicia used in this determination.72
68. It has been suggested, for instance, that a doctor who fails to offer an amniocentesis
to an older pregnant woman to detect the risk of gross chromosomal anomalies has been
negligent. See A. HOLDER, LEGAL ISSUES IN PEDIATRICS AND ADOLESCENT MEDICINE 32-37
(1977); P. REILLY, supra note 15, at 25 (this test in common use to detect these defects).
There obviously should be no imposition of liability, however, when even a specialist in
human genetics could not have predicted the occurrence of a specific defect.
69. Thus, a neurologist should know about the genetic basis of Huntington's disease.
See L. WHALEY, UNDERSTANDING INHERITED DISORDERS 35 (1974) (describing manifestations of
this disorder).
70. A doctor who failed to use a newly developed test for genetic disorders might argue
that the technique had not yet been adopted in similar communities. See, e.g., Johnson
v. Yeshiva Univ., 42 N.Y.2d 818, 364 N.E.2d 1340, 396 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1977) (child with
cri-du-chat syndrome, structural chromosomal anomaly, born in 1969 after mother had
received genetic counseling; failure to use amniocentesis not negligent practice at that
time); Park v. Nissen, No. 190033 (Cal. Super. Ct., Orange Cty., Dec. 13, 1974), reported in
31 CITATION 38 (Je. 1, 1975) (child with Down's Syndrome born in 1971; jury apparently
found that amniocentesis not required by community standard of care at that time).
These cases might well have a different result if they arose today. See pp. 1504-05 & note
68 supra.
71. See I D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, supra note 65, at 209 (citing Leighton v.
Sargent, 27 N.H. 460, 59 Am. Dec. 388 (1853), to illustrate long history of duty to "keep
up"). Although this requirement is more often mentioned in reference to specialists, see,
e.g., Naccarato v. Grob, 384 Mich. 248, 253-54, 180 N.W.2d 788, 790-91 (1970) (pediatrician);
Wood v. Vroman, 215 Mich. 449, 465-66, 184 N.W. 520, 525 (1921) (eye specialist), general
practitioners have a similar obligation, see, e.g., Flock v. J.C. Palumbo Fruit Co, 63
Idaho 220, 241, 118 P.2d 707, 714 (1941); Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 109, 235
N.E.2d 793, 798 (1968) (dicta).
72. See Viita v. Fleming, 132 Minn. 128, 137, 155 N.W. 1077, 1081 (1916). But cf.
Ciccarone v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 554, 564 (E.D. Pa. 1972), afJ'd on other grounds,
486 F.2d 253 (3rd Cir. 1973) (neurologist not negligent in using diagnostic technique even
though two articles had appeared in Journal of the American Medical Association about
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Even today, a physician's responsibility is often measured by the level
of practice in his or similar communities.7 3 This proviso could limit
physician liability when the community practice in perceiving genetic
risks is generally lax. Yet in view of the recent erosion of the locality
rule in favor of more uniform standards of care,7 4 an inadequate local
practice should not confer immunity from liability when deviations
from sound medical practice can be shown.7 .
2. The Reasonable Parent-The Physician's Duty to Inform
Diligent physicians may uncover a wide variety of genetic risks-some
grave, some insignificant. Yet it seems unreasonable to impose liability
on doctors for failing to tell prospective parents of the chance that their
children might have some benign or only slightly harmful genetic
trait.70 Instead, in deciding whether practitioners have been negligent
risk of procedure). Courts might also want to consider the dispersal of information
through such forums as medical association meetings, regional medical centers, and con-
tinuing education for physicians. See, e.g., Siirila v. Barrios, 398 Mich. 576, 615-17, 248
N.W.2d 171, 187 (1976) (Williams, J., concurring).
73. E.g., Burk v. Foster, 114 Ky. 20, 25-26, 69 S.W. 1096, 1097 (1902); Siirila v. Barrios,
58 Mich. App. 721, 724, 228 N.W.2d 801, 802-03 (1975), aff'd on other grounds, 398 Mich.
576, 589, 248 N.W.2d 171, 175 (1976) (general practitioners). The main implication of the
similar locality rule has been that rural practitioners have been held to a different, and
presumably lower, standard of care than a doctor in an urban center. In addition, a
physician might be responsible for knowing more about local diseases than would an
outsider.
74. In some instances, courts have stated that the level of care practiced in similar
communities is only one factor to be considered in determining the issue of negligence.
See, e.g., Douglas v. Bussabarger, 73 Wash. 2d 476, 488-90, 438 P.2d 829, 837-38 (1968);
Shier v. Freedman, 58 Wis. 2d 269, 283-84, 206 N.W.2d 166, 174 (1973). Other courts have
gone beyond that limit and have applied a uniform standard of care. See, e.g., Robbins v.
Footer, 553 F.2d 123, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (specialists); Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency
Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 200-01, 349 A.2d 245, 253 (1975) (all physicians).
75. There is some recognition, completely apart from the workings of the locality rule,
that even compliance with a high level of practice may not always be adequate. See, e.g.,
Faulkner v. Pezeshki, 44 Ohio App. 2d 186, 191, 337 N.E.2d 158, 163 (1975); Helling v.
Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (1974). In such cases, the courts essentially
ignore the medical standard and instead require physicians to conform to a judicially
imposed reasonable prudence test, often raising serious questions about the proper rela-
tionship between the courts and the medical profession. The proposal in this Note does
not face such difficulties since it would only compel doctors to comply with present
standards of medical care in detecting risks of genetic defects.
76. Some prospective parents will choose to use amniocentesis to abort selectively any
fetuses that either have detectable minor defects or are of the "wrong" sex. See Fraser &
Pressor, Attitudes Of Counselors In Relation To Prenatal Sex-Determination Simply For
Choice Of Sex, in GENE'rIc COUNS-LING, supra note 21, at 109. Other prospective parents
who would have made similar decisions had they been aware of the capabilities of prenatal
diagnosis are at least plausibly injured by their physicians' failure to inform them of
this possibility. Although courts have sometimes permitted parents to receive compensa-
tion from doctors who had failed to diagnose a woman's pregnancy in time for her to
obtain an abortion, see, e.g., Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 App. Div. 2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265
(1974), arguments can be made against awarding damages to the parents of a child whose
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in failing to communicate known or foreseeable risks, courts should be
guided by recently developed standards governing informed consent to
surgery and other medical treatment.77 Increasingly, those cases measure
the adequacy of disclosure not by the traditional rules defining medical
negligence7 but by what a reasonable person would need to know in
deciding whether to undergo treatment.79
A similar standard should be applied to measure a physician's duty
to disclose genetic risks.80 Although doctors in the contexts of both
informed consent and genetic counseling are not to make the ultimate
choice among various courses of action,8' they possess information that
birth they would have prevented had they known of the child's minor birth defects or
sex. The court in Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 111. App. 2d 240, 260, 190 N.E.2d 849, 858 (1963),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964), denied a cause of action brought on behalf of an
illegitimate child against his father on the ground that upholding such claims would
encourage the bringing of suits by "all others born into the world under conditions they
might regard as adverse." Similarly, the award of damages to parents of children with
only minor defects might foster suits brought by parents of any "less than ideal"
children. So long as one assumes that a reasonable person would not choose to abort
selectively on the basis of sex or of the presence of minor defects in the fetus, recognition
of such claims can be avoided simply by limiting the required amount of disclosure by
physicians to those genetic risks that a reasonable prospective parent would want to know
in making procreative decisions. See pp. 1507-08 infra.
77. See Capron, supra note 30, at 588-94 (discussing relationship between law of in-
formed consent and "informed decisionmaking in genetic counseling"). For contrasting
commentary on recent judicial criteria. for informed consent, see generally Capron, In-
formed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. Rav. 340
(1974); Goldstein, For Harold Lasswell: Some Reflections on Human Dignity, Entrapment,
Informed Consent, and the Plea Bargain, 84 YALE L.J. 683, 690-98 (1975); Riskin, Informed
Consent: Looking for the Action, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 580.
78. This standard is interpreted to require the disclosure that a reasonable physician
would make in similar circumstances. See, e.g., Green v. Hussey, 127 Ill. App. 2d 174, 262
N.E.2d 156 (1970); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, rehearing denied, 187
Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960).
79. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787, 792 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1972) (materiality of information to be disclosed need not be established by
expert testimony); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 627-28, 295 A.2d 676, 689 (1972)
(some factors relevant to this determination are "severity of the risk and the likelihood
of its occurrence"). Although this means that there are limits on what a physician must
disclose, see, e.g., Scaria v. Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 68 Wis. 2d 1, 12-13, 227
N.W.2d 647, 653 (1975) (no need to give "detailed technical medical explanation" or to
disclose "extremely remote possibilities" among several suggested limits), it is clear that
the exceptions to the general principle of disclosure must be drawn narrowly if informed
consent is to have any significance.
80. An action based on a lack of informed consent to pregnancy was expressly denied
in Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 App. Div. 2d 73, 81-82, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933, 938-39 (1977), a case
in which a physician's failure to warn prospective parents of their genetic risk had
allegedly resulted in the birth of a child with Down's Syndrome. That court distinguished
the traditional informed consent cases on the ground that the injury in such cases "arose
from some affirmative violation of the patient's physical integrity." Id. at 82, 394
N.Y.S.2d at 939. The informed consent analogy should not have been rejected in Karl-
sons since prospective parents need to know their genetic risks in order to make child-
bearing plans, in much the same way as a patient needs to know the medical risks inherent
in either undergoing or refusing treatment.
81. See Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 242, 502 P.2d 1, 9, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 513 (1972)
(stating as axiomatic patient's right to choose course of treatment); Schloendorff v. Society
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deciders often cannot otherwise easily obtain . 2 Indeed, it is usually
only through physician disclosure that prospective parents will be
given the opportunity to act to avert the birth of children with genetic
defects.8 3 Thus doctors should be required to inform prospective
parents of all the genetic risks84 and reproductive options that a reason-
able person would want to know in deciding whether to procreate.8,
of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914) (individual's right to determine what
happens to his body), overruled on other grounds. Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143
N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957); pp. 1495-96 supra (prospective parents should have right
to make ultimate procreative decisions).
82. In the area of informed consent, the physician's greater knowledge has meant that
his duty to disclose is not limited to answering a patient's questions. See Canterbury v.
Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 n.36 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972). The court in
Park v. Chessin, 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 84-87, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110, 112-14 (1977), refused to
dismiss causes of action based on the physicians' negligently telling prospective parents
that there was no chance that the polycystic kidney disease that had killed their first child
would recur; the true risk was one in four. It may have drawn an inappropriate line,
however, when it distinguished Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397
N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977), on the ground that the Howard parents had not actually asked about
the possibility that their children might have Tay-Sachs disease. Although physicians are
not and cannot be insurers of "genetic health," see pp. 1504-06 supra, the dissenting judge
in Howard convincingly argued that Dr. Lecher had breached the medical standard of
care in failing to suggest that tests were available to detect both the parents' risk of this
disorder and its possible occurrence in their unborn children. 42 N.Y.2d at 114-15, 366
N.E.2d at 67, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 366-67 (Cooke, J., dissenting).
83. It is possible that prospective parents might learn of certain of their genetic risks
from family planning or genetic screening programs. See pp. 1494, 1498 & notes 27, 39-40
supra.
84. Some of the specific factors to be considered in measuring the foreseeable relevance
of a particular genetic risk would include: the burden of the defect (compare Down's
Syndrome, which is inevitably associated with mental retardation, see note 15 supra, with
PKU, in which mental retardation can be averted by the use of a special diet, see note
14 supra); the likelihood of its occurrence (compare 50% or 75% risk that a dominant
trait will be passed on, see W. FUHRMANN & F. VoGEL, supra note 16, at 17-24, with one to
two percent risk of Down's Syndrome in women aged 40 to 45, see note 16 supra); and
whether the defect can be detected in utero (compare Tay-Sachs disease, which can be
detected by amniocentesis, see note 21 supra, with cystic fibrosis, which cannot, see note
25 supra). In applying the standard of adequate genetic risk disclosure, courts should
also require that physicians attempt to overcome the difficulties often encountered in
conveying this type of information. See p. 1495 & note 29 supra.
85. At least two of the exceptions to the informed consent requirement should be either
severely restricted or rejected in the context of genetic counseling. Although a patient
can waive his right to the information necessary for the exercise of an informed consent
to treatment simply by saying that he does not want to know, see Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d
229, 245, 502 P.2d 1, 12, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 516 (1972), the social interest in ensuring that
prospective parents have access to genetic risk information suggests that a waiver of genetic
counseling should be accomplished only through written refusal by the prospective
parents in a manner that amply demonstrates their knowledgeable decision to waive
counseling.
A physician may invoke therapeutic privilege as a defense to an alleged failure to
obtain informed consent by saying that the anxiety of a patient who knew about the
medical risks of treatment would have vitiated any beneficial effects of the procedure.
See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 628, 295 A.2d 676, 689 (1972). Whatever the
merits of such assertions in the area of informed consent to treatment, there can be 11o
situation in which a physician can justifiably withhold genetic counseling on the ground
that prospective parents would be "better off" without such knowledge.
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3. The Subjective Parent-The Requirement of Proximate Cause
Even though parents may be able to prove that their physicians
negligently failed either to detect or to disclose genetic risks, their
suits should fail unless they can show that the doctors' acts proximately
caused their defective children to be born.80 In the area of informed
consent, proximate cause is established by showing that the injury was
a foreseeable risk of the treatment given8 7 and that a reasonable person,
properly informed of the medical dangers associated with the available
procedures and with nontreatment, would not have submitted to the
procedure."" Such an "objective" standard is meant to protect physi-
cians 9 from particular patients' testimony that had they been better
informed they would have refused the treatment 0
Whatever merits such an objective rule of proximate causation may
have in informed consent cases generally,91 there is little reason for its
extension to cases involving genetic counseling. The interests of physi-
cians are adequately protected by the objective standard of disclosure;
the doctors should be required, at minimum, to disclose those risks that
would be relevant to a reasonable person. Rather than the stringent
86. Cf. Smith v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 654, 655 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (Texas law)
(maternal rubella; since physician could not have enabled child to be born healthy, his
failure to warn parents had not proximately caused child's injury).
87. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781, 791-92 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Bowers v. Garfield, 382 F. Supp. 503, 505-06 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
88. This "reasonable person" standard was adopted in three landmark decisions handed
down in 1972, Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 790-91 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 245, 502 P.2d 1, 11-12, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515-
16 (1972); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 628-29, 295 A.2d 676, 690 (1972), and has
been adopted in other jurisdictions, see, e.g., Bowers v. Garfield, 382 F. Supp. 503, 505-06
(E.D. Pa. 1974); Scaria v. Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 68 Wis. 2d 1, 13-15, 227
N.W.2d 647, 654-55 (1975).
89. The courts often expressly stated their unwillingness to place "the physician in
jeopardy of the patient's bitterness and disillusionment." Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229,
245, 502 P.2d 1, 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515 (1972); accord, Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d
772, 790-91 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Scaria v. Saint Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 68 Wis. 2d 1, 15, 227 N.W.2d 647, 655 (1975).
90. Indeed, the content of a patient's testimony on this issue may even be deemed to
have no significance. See Hamilton v. Hardy, 549 P.2d 1099, 1105 (Colo. App. 1976), cert.
denied, id. (fact that plaintiff had not testified as to whether she would have stopped
using "Pill" had she known of risks involved irrelevant); Fogal v. Genesee Hosp., 41
App. Div. 2d 468, 474, 344 N.Y.S.2d 552, 560 (1973) (dictum) (patient's testimony not
dispositive even had she said that she would have had surgery anyway). But see Holt v.
Nelson, 11 Wash. App. 230, 236, 523 P.2d 211, 216 (1974) (patient's testimony relevant as
part of evidence in spite of its self-serving nature).
91. There have been suggestions in the literature that the application of an "objective"
standard of proximate cause in informed consent cases is too harsh on plaintiff patients.
See, e.g., Capron, supra note 77, at 420-23 (subjective test); Riskin, supra note 77, at 600-06
(either remove proximate cause requirement altogether or require "showing that [patient]
might have withheld consent"); Comment, Informed Consent After Cobbs-Has the Patient
Been Forgotten?, 10 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 913, 924-27 (1973) (subjective test).
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standard derived from informed consent cases, a more subjective proxi-
mate cause requirement should be adopted in the genetic counseling
context. Parents should be required only to show that they would not
have had the children concerned had they known of their foreseeable
genetic risks; the obvious evidentiary problems entailed by this
standard are a necessary aspect of preserving parental autonomy in
procreative decisionmaking. 92
4. The Physician as Conscientious Objector
In suits brought for failure to provide information about genetic
risk, physicians with religious objections to the use of contraception or
abortion" may raise the defense that imposition of tort liability would
coerce their involvement in decisions that result in action repugnant
to their convictions. Such physicians cannot be required to perform
contraceptive sterilization or abortion operations.9 4 Yet a doctor's con-
scientious refusal to disclose information about genetic risk to prospec-
tive parents effectively forecloses their informed procreative decision-
making. Except where the risks have been uncovered in a genetic
screening program, prospective parents are not likely to learn of
such possibilities except through doctors' warnings.95 By contrast, per-
92. By the time of trial, the parents might well have found the reality of having a
genetically defective child much more burdensome than they would have believed had
they been warned prior to the child's birth. Yet when a person's recollection of a prior
occurrence may be colored by after-the-fact events, courts have often let such considera-
tions go only to the weight of his testimony, leaving to the factfinder the task of discern-
ing its truth. Chief Justice Weintraub, dissenting in part to the landmark decision in
Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 63, 227 A.2d 689, 711 (1967), implied this approach for
parental testimony that they would have obtained an abortion had they known that their
unborn child might be injured by maternal rubella. Contra, Rieck v. Medical Protective
Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 519, 219 N.W.2d 242, 245 (1974).
93. See, e.g., Padin v. Fordham Hosp., 392 F. Supp. 447, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (tubal
ligation not performed at time of plaintiff's Caesarean section because anesthesiologist said
that contraceptive sterilization contravened his beliefs as Roman Catholic); Karlsons v.
Guerinot, 57 App. Div. 2d 73, 83-84, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933, 940 (1977) (physician stated his
religious objection to abortion).
94. The Church Amendment, passed by Congress in 1973, protects the rights of in-
dividuals and hospitals to refuse to provide nontherapeutic abortion and contraceptive
sterilization operations where to do so would contravene their "religious beliefs or moral
convictions." Health Programs Extension Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-45, 87 Stat. 95 (1973),
as amended by National Research Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 353 (1974) (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (Supp. V 1975)). The right of a conscientiously objecting physician not
to participate in abortion or contraceptive sterilization operations has never been directly
litigated but was assumed in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 197-98 (1973) (abortion), and in
Padin v. Fordham Hosp., 392 F. Supp. 447, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (contraceptive sterilization).
95. Prospective parents who justifiably fear that their children might be born defective
may nonetheless rely on the negligently given reassurances of their physicians. See, e.g.,
Park v. Chessin, 88 Misc. 2d 222, 224-25, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204, 206-07 (Sup. Ct. 1976) afj'd, 60
App. Div. 2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977) (polycystic kidney disease); Jacobs v. Theimer,
519 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1975) (rubella); cf. Johnson v. Yeshiva Univ., 42 N.Y.2d 818',
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sons seeking physicians' services in connection with contraception or
abortion are already aware of their needs, and the refusal of one doctor
to provide these services will generally not prevent their finding
another practitioner who will.9o Moreover, a requirement that physi-
cians provide information about genetic risk is far less burdensome than
one that they perform the objectionable operations themselves. Indeed,
disclosure of such information may not ultimately result in the use of
either contraception or abortion; prospective parents might well decide
to procreate despite such a warning. In other situations, investigation
might prove prospective parents' fears of specific genetic defects to be
groundless, permitting them to go ahead with their childbearing plans.
Yet, in the end, it may be possible to avoid even this limited intrusion
on the physicians' religious convictions.
To serve legitimate needs of prospective parents, courts need not
require objecting doctors either to undertake techniques to ascertain
a person's genetic risk or even to provide prospective parents with
genetic counseling. Instead, courts should require such physicians to
conform to the standard of care exercised by other doctors in uncover-
ing indications that prospective parents among their patients may be at
genetic risk and to suggest that those patients go to other doctors to ob-
tain any necessary additional testing and counseling.9 7 Although even
819, 364 N.E.2d 1340, 1341, 396 N.Y.S.2d 647, 647 (1977) (cri-du-chat syndrome; failure to
perform amniocentesis). The inequality of knowledge between the doctor and the prospec-
tive parents should counter any allegation that the latter's failure to seek out genetic
counseling constitutes contributory negligence. Similarly, in Martineau v. Nelson, 247
N.W.2d 409 (Minn. 1976), an inadequately performed tubal ligation had resulted in an
unplanned childbirth. On appeal, the court held that the jury's finding that the husband
had been 50% contributorily negligent in not obtaining a vasectomy was not justified.
Id. at 416-17. The court stated that because the physicians had superior knowledge, their
giving conflicting advice on the advisability of his undergoing sterilization had breached
an obligation to give clear information and advice. Id. at 417.
96. Indeed, many of the courts that have permitted doctors or hospitals to refuse to
perform abortion or sterilization operations expressly noted that the desired services
would be available elsewhere. See, e.g., Allen v. Sisters of Saint Joseph, 361 F. Supp. 1212
(N.D. Tex. 1973), dismissed as moot, 490 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (other
hospitals in city would perform tubal ligation; defendant hospital's religious objection to
procedure protected even though it would force plaintiff to have second operation or to
be moved in traction); Watkins v. Mercy Medical Center, 364 F. Supp. 799 (D. Idaho 1973),
aff'd 520 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1975) (physician could not force hospital to permit performance
of sterilizations and abortions when such procedures were available at five other hospitals
within 50-mile radius). But see Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hosp., 47! F.2d 756, 762 (7th
Cir. 1973) (availability of abortions in public hospitals irrelevant in determining whether
a denominational hospital should be required to permit such procedures).
97. See Milunsky & Reilly, The "New" Genetics: Emerging Medicolegal Issues in the
Prenatal Diagnosis of Hereditary Disorders, I Am. J.L. MED. 71, 76 (1975) (noting, however,
that such physicians need not perform procedures such as amniocentesis themelves but
must refer to doctors who will do them).
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this obligation may disturb the scruples of some practitioners, 8 it is
nevertheless needed to give prospective parents the opportunity to learn
of their genetic risks.
B. Determining the Measure of Damages
Parents may suffer two types of compensable injuries from the birth
of a defective child. The first is the net economic burden caused by
the doctor's failure to provide accurate genetic risk information. To
establish liability, of course, parents must prove that they would have
averted the birth of the afflicted child had their physician not been
negligent in failing to inform them of their genetic riskY9 An appro-
priate approximation of their economic injury would be the entire
financial burden of raising the child, 100 offset by any joy or benefit he
might provide them.1' 1 In the case of a severely defective child, this
measure would produce the substantial recovery to which the parents
are entitled; the benefits of having such a child would hardly be com-
mensurate with the costs of rearing him. When a child has less serious
disorders,102 however, the offset for benefits received could limit re-
covery to little more than the extraordinary support costs occasioned
by his specific defect. 10 3
98. Interview with Margery W. Shaw, M.D., J.D., on February 6, 1978 (notes on file
with Yale Law Journal). But cf. Gordis, Childs & Roseman, supra note 28, at 471 (survey
showing that 41% of obstetricians who opposed abortion nonetheless favored genetic
screening programs).
99. See pp. 1504-10 supra.
100. Becker v. Schwartz, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119 (App. Div. 1977), is the only case in which
an appellate court has upheld the parents' cause of action "for the expenses of raising
and institutionalizing the afflicted child." Id. at 120 (Titone, J., concurring in result).
That court, however, did not discuss the desirability of reducing the amount of damages
by any benefits the parents received from the child. Other courts have stated that the
support obligations of the parents of a child with congenital or genetic defects could
extend beyond the age of the child's majority. See Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260
N.W.2d 169, 176 n.11 (Minn. 1977).
101. Similar reductions have been made in cases in which parents have been awarded
the economic costs of raising a healthy child born after a failure of contraception or
abortion. See note 61 supra.
102. If the unwanted genetic trait is only slightly harmful or even benign, the parents
should not even be allowed to state a valid cause of action. See note 76 supra.
103. Other measures of damages, perhaps taking into account the impact of the
afflicted child's birth on the parents' childbearing plans, would produce a conceptually
more satisfactory solution than that proposed by this Note. For example, the compensa-
tion awarded to parents who otherwise would have used selective abortion, artificial in-
semination by donor, or adoption to have a healthy child could be the extraordinary
support expenses incurred on behalf of their afflicted child plus the difference between
the benefits that will be provided by that child and those that would have been derived
from the healthy child they would have had. If, however, parents would have chosen not
to have children, they would recover all economic costs of raising the child they have,
not merely the extraordinary support expenses, less any benefits they receive from him.
Such a scheme would give parents of genetically defective children a significant incentive
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The second element of the parents' compensable injury is the emo-
tional anguish caused by the afflicted child's birth. Although appellate
courts have often been receptive to various assertions of economic
damages, 04 they have almost uniformly refused to compensate parents
of genetically defective children for their emotional distress.10 Until
1976, courts stated simply that these emotional injuries were too
speculative to be measured. 00  In Howard v. Lecher,107  however,
the New York Court of Appeals invoked a new basis for denying
recovery for such a claim. In light of its finding that the parents'
anguish had been produced exclusively by their witnessing the course of
their child's disorder, 08 the court deemed them bystanders to the
infant's suffering, 09 clearly outside the narrow scope of New York's
"zone of physical danger" rule setting limits on third-party recovery
for emotional distress."10 If other state courts follow the lead of the
New York Court of Appeals in viewing parents as bystanders to their
children's suffering, parental recovery for emotional anguish would be
to testify that they would not have had any children had they known of their genetic
risk in order to obtain the usually more generous recovery. Defendant physicians, on the
other hand, would have little chance of proving that the parents' testimony was untrue.
Thus to avoid the tremendous problems of proof that would be inherent in litigating
such issues, it seems more appropriate to adopt the measure of damages suggested at
p. 1512 supra.
104. See note 13 supra.
105. The exception is Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 App. Div. 2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933
(1977) (child born with Down's Syndrome). Karlsons was decided two months before the
New York Court of Appeals explicitly refused to grant emotional pain and suffering
damages to the parents of a child with Tay-Sachs disease in Howard v. Lecher, 42
N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977). Were Karlsons to be appealed, it
would almost certainly be reversed.
106. Some courts have found the extent of such claims to be even more difficult to
evaluate than that of other asserted injuries. The court in Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d
846, 849 (rex. 1975), although allowing parents to recover the medical expenses incurred
in caring for a child injured by maternal rubella, refused to compensate them for their
emotional pain and suffering on the ground that such an award would entail "specula-
tion ... as to the pluses and minuses of parental mind and emotion." Accord, Park v.
Chessin, 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 86, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110, 113 (1977) (impossibility of calculating
emotional distress damages).
107. 53 App. Div. 2d 420, 386 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1976), aff'd, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64,
397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977). The appellate division decision in this case has already been the
subject of much commentary. See, e.g., 41 ALB. L. REv. 162 (1977); 12 NEw ENG. L. REV. 819
(1977); 38 U. Pirr. L. REv. 550 (1977).
108. Melisa Howard had Tay-Sachs disease, a genetic disorder that inevitably causes
death by the age of four or five years. See p. 1489 & note 6 supra.
109. Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 112, 366 N.E.2d 64, 66, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363, 365
(1977).
110. The standard, as set forth in Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419,
301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969), allows compensation for a claimant's own emotional pain and
suffering and consequent physical harm only when a tortfeasor had caused him to fear
for his personal safety. See also Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970);
Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
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barred even in states with more liberal rules for bystander recovery., 1
Neither barrier to compensation for emotional injury can withstand
scrutiny. Damages for emotional pain and suffering are awarded in a
variety of other contexts,' 12 and courts have failed to discern any unique
problems in measuring the distress caused by the birth of children with
genetic defects. Moreover, the Howard court's bystander analogy is in-
appropriate. The rules governing such cases reflect judicial fear of
imposing unlimited liability on negligent tortfeasors."13 When the
parents of a genetically defective child seek to recover damages, how-
ever, there is no danger of unlimited physician liability; if the child is
not allowed to recover damages for his claim of wrongful life and his
own suffering, the parents are the only available claimants." 4 More-
over, the parents of a child with genetic defects are not mere witnesses
to his suffering. Rather, they are forced to realize that because of their
lack of knowledge they did not act to prevent the child's birth, thus
becoming unconsenting participants in causing the pain that they clear-
ly must observe.
Conclusion
Knowledge about human genetics can often enable prospective
parents to avoid the birth of defective children. Yet the courts have not
111. Parents of genetically defective children, if deemed to be bystanders, would
likely be denied damages for their emotional distress even in California where the "zone
of emotional shock" rule, first promulgated in Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912,
69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968), is one of the most liberal bystander recovery standards in the
country. The courts of that state, in applying the Dillon rule, have interpreted it to re-
quire that the claimant haie witnessed the infliction of manifestly terrible injuries upon
their close relatives. See Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97
(1977) (plaintiff fathers present in delivery room during stillbirths of their sons; cause of
action for emotional pain and suffering denied because court found that they had not
known of stillbirths until they were told by doctors); Shepard v. Porter, 76 Cal. App. 3d
16, 142 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1977) (family's causes of action stated in both strict liability and
breach of warranty; child had fallen out of defective back door of stationwagon and been
killed when run over by another car); Mobaldi v. Board of Regents, 55 Cal. App. 3d 573,
127 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1976) (plaintiff's cause of action sustained; her foster son, during
negligently performed infusion with radioopaque dye, had become spastic, convulsant, and
comatose in her arms); Jansen v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center, 31 Cal. App. 3d 22,
106 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1973) (failure of diagnosis caused deterioration and death of child;
mother's cause of action denied because she had not had sensory perception of tortious
act).
112. See p. 1503 & note 62 supra. The normal measure of damages in such cases is
compensation for all the pain and suffering caused by the tortfeasor's act. See, e.g., CALI-
FORNIA JURY INSTRUcTIONs CIVIL §§ 12.80, .83 8- .88 (6th rev. ed. 1977); see also ILLINOIs
PATTERN JURY INsTRucrIONs CIVIL § 30.05 (2d ed. 1971).
113. The plaintiff in Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 615-17, 619, 249 N.E.2d 419,
422-24, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 558-61 (1969), a mother who had heard an automobile accident
that had seriously injured her young child, was denied recovery for her emotional distress
because the court could see no logical way to avoid extending compensation to even
casual, but sensitive, bystanders once such an award had been made.
114. See pp. 1500-03 & note 63 supra.
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met the challenge presented by suits brought against physicians whose
failure to provide adequate counseling had allegedly caused such
children to be born. The judicial reluctance to establish consistent
guidelines for the imposition of tort liability and to award adequate
damages has inhibited the vindication of the social interest in ensuring
that prospective parents have access to such information. This Note
proposes that the parents of a genetically defective child should have a
cause of action when they can show that the doctor knew or, acting
within the standard of care of similarly situated practitioners, should
have known of the risk of that disorder, that he should have foreseen
that such information would be relevant to a reasonable person, and
that had these parents known of this possibility, they would not have
had that child. Once these requirements have been met, the parents
should be awarded substantial damages for their emotional anguish
and economic injury.
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